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Summary
In 1998 and 1999, the United States and its NATO allies attempted to put an end
to escalating violence between ethnic Albanian guerrillas and Yugoslav/Serb forces
in Yugoslavia’s Kosovo region.  They were outraged by Serb atrocities against ethnic
Albanian civilians, and feared that the conflict could drag in other countries and
destabilize the region.  These efforts culminated in a 78-day NATO bombing
campaign against Serbia from March to June 1999.  Yugoslav leader Slobodan
Milosevic withdrew his forces from the province in June 1999.   Since that time,
Kosovo has been governed by a U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), under the terms
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244. At an undetermined time after an
autonomous government is in place, Kosovo’s final status is to be considered.
Almost all ethnic Albanians want independence for Kosovo; Serbs say it should
remain within Serbia.  The NATO-led peacekeeping force KFOR is charged with
providing a secure environment for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1244.
In May 2001, UNMIK issued a “Constitutional Framework” for Kosovo.  The
Constitutional Framework provides for an elected legislature and an autonomous
government with limited powers, but does not deal with Kosovo’s final status.
Elections for the Kosovo assembly were held on November 17, 2001.   About half
of eligible Serb voters  participated in the vote, after being urged to do so by the
Yugoslav and Serbian governments.  Political wrangling delayed the formation of a
government for months, but one was finally approved by the parliament in March
2002.  It consists of members of the three leading ethnic Albanian parties, as well as
a Serb minister and one from a non-Serb minority. In 2003, UNMIK began the
process of transferring some of its powers to the Kosovo government.
Bush Administration officials have said that they support autonomy for Kosovo
within Serbia or the Serbia-Montenegro union,  but not independence.  President
Bush has said that, while the United States is looking to reduce its forces in the
Balkans, the United States would only do so in conjunction with its NATO allies.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, Administration
officials said that U.S. forces in the Balkans could be withdrawn if they were needed
for the war on terrorism.  The war in Iraq has also stretched the U.S. military’s
deployment capabilities.   The United States has not unilaterally withdrawn its troops,
but cuts in KFOR troop strength in the past year has halved U.S. troop levels from
about 5,500 to 2,250 today, and are expect to decrease further by the end of 2003.
In 1999, Congress explicitly approved nor blocked U.S. participation in NATO
air strikes against Serbia, but appropriated funds for the air campaign and the U.S.
peacekeeping deployment in Kosovo. In 2000, several Members unsuccessfully
attempted to condition the U.S. military deployment in Kosovo on congressional
approval and on the implementation of aid pledges made by European countries.
Since 1999, Congress has provided funding for reconstruction in Kosovo, but limited
U.S. aid to 15% of the total amount pledged by all countries.  In 2003, several
resolutions have been introduced that support independence for Kosovo.   This report
will be updated as events warrant.
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Kosovo and U.S. Policy
Most Recent Developments
Michael Steiner, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General
(SRSG) charged with overseeing the U.N. Mission in Kosovo, ended his term in July
2003.  His replacement has yet to be named, but will likely be nominated by the
European Union.  In the interim, Principal Deputy Charles Brayshaw of the United
States heads the U.N. mission.
At the June 2003 European Union summit, the Kosovo government and the
Serbian government agreed to hold direct talks on issues of common concern.  The
agenda for the discussions has not been set, but could include a wide range of issues,
including  pensions, electricity, transportation, security for ethnic minorities, and the
fate of missing persons on both sides.  One issue that is unlikely to be dealt with is
the future status of the province.  The date for the first talks has not been scheduled,
but they may take place by the end of the summer. 
Introduction
In 1998 and 1999, the United States and its NATO allies attempted to put an end
to escalating violence between ethnic Albanian guerrillas and Yugoslav forces in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Kosovo region.  They were outraged by Serb
atrocities against ethnic Albanian civilians, and feared that the conflict could drag in
other countries and destabilize the region.  These efforts culminated in a 78-day
NATO bombing campaign against Serbia from March to June 1999.  Yugoslav leader
Slobodan Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces from the province in June 1999,
clearing the way for the deployment of U.S. and other NATO peacekeepers.  While
NATO’s action ended Milosevic’s depredations in Kosovo, it has left U.S. and other
Western policymakers with many difficult issues to deal with.  These include creating
the conditions for the resumption of a normal life in Kosovo, including setting up an
autonomous government and reconstruction of the province, as well as dealing with
the thorny issue of Kosovo’s final status. Additional challenges emerged after the
deployment, including the rise of ethnic Albanian guerrilla movements in southern
Serbia and Macedonia, which threatened to destabilize the region before they were
dismantled in 2001.
U.S. engagement in Kosovo has been controversial.   Proponents of engagement
say that instability in Kosovo could have a negative impact on the stability of the
Balkans and therefore of Europe as a whole, which they view as a vital interest of the
United States.  They believe instability in the region could produce an environment
favorable to organized crime and terrorism. In addition, they claim that such
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instability could deal a damaging blow to the credibility and future viability of NATO
and Euro-Atlantic cooperation. They say the involvement of the United States is
critical to ensuring this stability, because of its resources and political credibility.  
Critics, including some in Congress, say that the situation in Kosovo does not
have as large an impact on vital U.S. interests as other issues, particularly the war on
terrorism in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States and
a possible war with Iraq.  They say that the Kosovo mission harms the readiness of
U.S. forces to deal with these more important contingencies.   They see the mission
in Kosovo as an ill-advised, open-ended exercise with unclear objectives.  They call
on European countries to take on the whole burden of the peacekeeping mission.
Both congressional advocates and opponents of U.S. engagement insist that the
Europeans pay the lion’s share of reconstruction aid to Kosovo. Reflecting increased
international focus on the global anti-terrorism campaign, there appears to be
growing interest in establishing a roadmap for “finishing the job,” including an
eventual “exit strategy” for the international civil and military administration of
Kosovo. 
War in Kosovo: February 1998-June 1999
Kosovo At a Glance
Area: 10,849 sq. km., or slightly smaller than Connecticut
Population: 1.956 million (1991 Yugoslav census)
Ethnic Composition: 82.2% Albanian; 9.9%   Serbian.  Smaller groups include
Muslims, Roma, Montenegrins, Turks and others. (1991 Yugoslav census)  
Although the war in Kosovo had deep historical roots, its immediate causes can
be found in the decision of Milosevic regime in Serbia to eliminate the autonomy of
its Kosovo province in 1989. The regime committed widespread human rights abuses
in the following decade, at first meeting only non-violent resistance from the
province’s ethnic Albanian majority.  However, in 1998 ethnic Albanians calling
themselves the Kosovo Liberation Army began attacks on Serbian police and
Yugoslav army troops.  The Milosevic regime responded with increasingly violent
and indiscriminate  repression. From February 1998 until March 1999, conflict
between the ethnic Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serb forces (as
well as Serb attacks on ethnic Albanian civilians) drove over 400,000 people from
their homes and killed more than 2,500 people. 
The United States and other Western countries used sanctions and other forms
of pressure to try to persuade Milosevic to cease repression and restore autonomy to
Kosovo, without success. The increasing deterioration of the situation on the ground
led the international Contact Group (United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy
and Russia) to agree on January 29, 1999 on a draft peace plan for Kosovo.  They
invited the two sides to Rambouillet, near  Paris, to start peace talks based on the
plan on February 6.  As an inducement to the parties to comply, on January 30 the
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North Atlantic Council agreed to authorize NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana
to launch NATO air strikes against targets in Serbia, after consulting with NATO
members, if the Serb side rejected the peace plan.  NATO said it was also studying
efforts to curb the flow of arms to the  rebels.  The draft peace plan called for 3-year
interim settlement that would provide greater autonomy for Kosovo within
Yugoslavia, and the deployment of a  NATO-led international military force to help
implement the agreement.   On March 18, 1999, the ethnic Albanian delegation to the
peace talks signed the plan, but the Yugoslav delegation rejected it.
NATO began air strikes on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March 24,
1999.  Yugoslav forces moved rapidly to expel most of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians
from their homes, many of which were looted and burned.   A December 1999 State
Department report estimated the total number of refugees and displaced persons at
over 1.5 million, over 90% of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population. The report says
that Yugoslav forces killed about 10,000 ethnic Albanians, and abused, tortured and
raped others. After 78 days of increasingly intense air strikes that inflicted damage
on Yugoslavia’s infrastructure and its armed forces,  President Milosevic agreed on
June 3 to a peace plan based on NATO demands and a proposal from the Group of
Eight countries (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Russia
and Japan).  It called for the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo; the
deployment of an international peacekeeping force with NATO at its core; and
international administration of Kosovo until elected interim institutions are set up,
under which Kosovo will enjoy wide-ranging autonomy within Yugoslavia.
Negotiations would be eventually be opened on Kosovo’s final status.
On June 9, 1999, NATO and Yugoslav military officers concluded a Military
Technical Agreement governing the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo.
On June 10, the U.N. Security Council approved UNSC Resolution 1244, based on
the international peace plan agreed to by Milosevic.  KFOR began to enter Kosovo
on June 11.  The Yugoslav pullout was completed on schedule on June 20.  On June
20, the KLA and NATO signed a document on the demilitarization of the KLA.  (For
historical background to the conflict in Kosovo, see CRS Report RS20213, Kosovo:
Historical Background to the Current Conflict.  For chronologies of the conflict in
Kosovo, see Kosovo Conflict Chronology: January-August 1998, CRS Report 98-
752 F; Kosovo Conflict Chronology: September, 1998—March, 1999, CRS Report
RL30127; and the daily Kosovo Situation Reports collections for April (CRS Report
RL30137), May (CRS Report RL30156), and June 1999 (CRS Report RL30191).
Within weeks of the pullout of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and the
deployment of  NATO-led peacekeeping force KFOR, the overwhelming majority
of ethnic Albanian refugees returned to their homes.  At the same time, over 200,000
ethnic Serbs and other  minorities living in Kosovo left the province, according to the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. International officials estimate the number
of Serbs living in Kosovo at about 100,000.  Many of the Serbs remaining in the
province live in northern Kosovo, many  in or near the divided town of Mitrovica.
The rest are scattered in isolated enclaves in other parts of the province, protected by
KFOR troops.  A key reason for the departures is violence and intimidation by ethnic
Albanians.  Kosovo Serbs say that since the pullout of Yugoslav forces, over 1,100
were killed  and over 1,000 are missing. Hundreds of houses of Serb refugees have
been looted and burned. 
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Current Situation in Kosovo
Since June 1999, Kosovo has been ruled by the U.N. Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK).  According to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, UNMIK is tasked
with gradually transferring its administrative responsibilities to elected, interim
autonomous government institutions, while retaining an oversight role. In a final
stage, UNMIK will oversee the transfer of authority from the interim autonomous
institutions to permanent ones, after Kosovo’s final status is determined.
Kosovo took the first steps in establishing its own elected institutions on
October 28, 2000, when OSCE-supervised municipal elections were held.  Most of
the parties running in the election differed little from each other on ideological
grounds, and are based more on personal loyalties and clan and regional affiliations.
The biggest of several parties to be formed from the ex-KLA is the Democratic Party
of Kosovo (PDK), headed by Thaci. Another significant, although smaller, ex-KLA
group is the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), led by Ramush Haradinaj. A
third key political force in the province is Democratic League of Kosova (LDK),
headed by Ibrahim Rugova.  
The LDK was by far the ethnic Albanian largest party before the war, but it
began to lose ground after what some ethnic Albanians viewed as a passive stance
during the war.  However, the behavior of some ex-KLA leaders since the war,
including organized crime activity and violence against ethnic Albanian political
opponents, resulted in an improvement in the “more civilized” LDK’s standing.  The
LDK won 58% of the vote province-wide, the PDK 27.3%, the AAK, 7.7%.   Kosovo
Serbs boycotted the vote, charging that UNMIK and KFOR have been ineffective in
protecting them from ethnic Albanian violence.  They claimed that UNMIK and
KFOR are working toward the establishment of an independent Kosovo, which they
oppose. 
After consultation with local leaders, UNMIK issued a Constitutional
Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo in May 2001.  The
Constitutional Framework calls for the establishment of a 120-seat legislature, which
will elect a President and a  Prime Minister.  Twenty seats were reserved for ethnic
minorities, including 10 for Serbs, but Serbs do not have a veto power on laws passed
by the ethnic Albanian majority in the body.  UNMIK retains oversight or control of
policy in many areas, including law enforcement, the judiciary,  protecting the rights
of communities, monetary and budget policy, customs, state property and enterprises,
and external relations.  UNMIK can invalidate legislation passed by the parliament
if it is in conflict with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244.  KFOR remains in
charge of Kosovo’s security.  The Constitutional Framework does not address the
question of Kosovo’s final status. 
Leaders of ethnic Albanian parties voiced disappointment that the document did
not allow for a referendum to decide Kosovo’s final status.  They also said that the
Constitutional Framework gives Kosovars the illusion of self-rule rather than the
reality, since it reserves many key powers for UNMIK.  Kosovo Serb leaders
condemned the Constitutional Framework, saying it paved the way for Kosovo’s
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1  The text  of  the consti tutional framework can be found at
[http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm]
independence and did not contain a mechanism to prevent the ethnic Albanian-
dominated legislature from abusing the rights of Serbs.1
On November 17, 2001, voters in Kosovo and displaced persons residing
outside of the province went to the polls to select the Assembly. The moderate
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK in Albanian) won 47 seats.  The nationalist
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the largest party formed from the former
Kosovo Liberation Army, won 26 seats.  Return, a coalition of Serbian parties, won
22 seats.  The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), an ex-KLA party that has
tried to position itself as a pragmatic force, won 8 seats.  Four small ethnic Albanian
parties won one seat each. The remaining 13 seats were won by parties representing
the Bosniak, Turkish and Roma communities.   
In contrast to their boycott of the 2000 local elections, Kosovo Serbs turned out
in substantial numbers to vote in the November 2001 legislative elections.   Turnout
in Serb-majority areas was about 47%, according to the OSCE, while turnout in
Serbia and Montenegro was about 57%.  (This compares with a turnout of about 67%
in Albanian-majority areas). Serb turnout may have been depressed by conflicting
messages from Serb leaders. In the months leading up to the vote, Yugoslav and
Serbian leaders in Belgrade condemned UNMIK and KFOR’s ineffectiveness in
protecting Serbs in Kosovo and criticized the Constitutional Framework and the
planned elections.  However, after reaching a November 5, 2001 agreement with
UNMIK, they called for Kosovo Serbs to vote.  Nevertheless, some Kosovo Serbs
continued to call for a boycott, saying that Serb participation would legitimize
Kosovo institutions that would eventually lead to independence from Yugoslavia.
OSCE observers noted some efforts by boycott supporters to intimidate potential
voters, especially in Serb-controlled northern Kosovo.  
After months of political wrangling,  the Assembly chose a President and a
government in March  2002.   LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova was elected as President.
Kosovo’s Prime Minister is Bajram Rexhepi of the PDK.  The government consists
of members of the LDK, PDK and AAK.  One cabinet post is reserved for a Kosovo
Serb representative and another for a member of a non-Serb minority group.  The
Kosovo Serbs initially refused to join the government, saying they wanted greater
representation, but finally agreed to do so in May 2002, after Steiner agreed to
appoint a Kosovo Serb as an advisor on refugee returns.  
Kosovo held its second local elections on October 26, 2002.  Turnout for the
vote was 54%, lower than in the previous two elections.  Observers attribute the low
turnout to disillusionment with the performance of the government and political
parties in Kosovo.  The LDK confirmed its status as the leading party in Kosovo, but
lost ground compared to previous elections.  The LDK won 45% of the vote, the
PDK 29%, and the AAK 8.55%.  Serb turnout was particularly low, at about 20%.
Almost no Serbs voted in the troubled northern town of Mitrovica, where local
authorities intimidated potential voters.  Among those Serbs who did vote in the
elections, the moderate Povratak (Return) coalition did poorly, while hard-line parties
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did well.  These results may indicate continuing Serb dissatisfaction with their
situation in Kosovo, and with the failure of Serb moderates to improve it.  
Kosovo’s area of greatest violence since NATO’s deployment has been the
northern town of Kosovska Mitrovica, which is divided between the Serb-controlled
north and the Albanian-controlled south on either side of the Ibar river.  The Serbs
demand the town’s partition and recognition of a Serb-controlled municipality, while
the Albanians call for UNMIK to unite the town and end the Serbs’ armed blockade
of the bridge separating the two sections.  UNMIK and KFOR have largely tolerated
the town’s division, in the interest of preventing conflict, and have not tried to
establish U.N. authority over northern Mitrovica by force.  Tensions on the Serb side
have recently flared up in response to UNMIK arrests of some of the self-designated
Serb “bridge watchers,” with numerous demonstrations and protest rallies taking
place.  Mitrovica remains the  area of Kosovo most likely to explode into renewed
violent conflict.  The challenge for UNMIK and the interim Kosovo government is
to eliminate Mitrovica’s parallel administrative and security structures, while
providing for the security needs of the town’s Serb inhabitants.   
In November  2002, after the failure of municipal elections in north Mitrovica,
UNMIK, with the agreement of the Serbian government, took over control of Serb-
controlled north Mitrovica, dissolving the parallel Serb institutions, permitting the
removal of the blockades, and the extension of the jurisdiction of Kosovo’s police
force to the area.  The Serbian government has pledged to stop funding the parallel
institutions.  However, ethnic Albanians have expressed concerns that the deal will
not truly reunite the city, since the jurisdiction of the ethnic Albanian-controlled city
council will not extend there, the local administration in north Mitrovica will likely
be filled with Serbs previously employed by the parallel institutions, and refugees are
not guaranteed a speedy return to their homes.
In early 2003 Steiner began the process of transferring some powers from
UNMIK to the Kosovo government, as foreseen in UNSC Resolution 1244.  Before
leaving his post in July 2003, Steiner said that he hoped the process will be
completed by the end of the year.  However, even after the transfer is completed,
UNMIK will still retain control over many critical issues such as setting the
“financial and policy parameters” for Kosovo’s budget, customs policy, law and
order, and external relations.  Serbian officials have sharply criticized the transferring
of powers, viewing it as further steps along the road to Kosovo’s independence.
At the June 2003 EU summit, the Kosovo government and the Serbian
government agreed to hold direct talks on issues of common concern.  The agenda
for the discussions has not been set, but could include a wide range of issues,
including  pensions, electricity, transportation, security for ethnic minorities, and the
fate of missing persons on both sides.  One issue that is unlikely to be dealt with is
the future status of the province.  The date for the first talks has not been scheduled,
but they  may take place by the end of the summer. 
An  important issue in Kosovo has been the status of ethnic Albanian prisoners
in Serbian jails. A February 2001 amnesty law  led to the release of many of those
jailed, although about 200 persons remained imprisoned.  About half of the group
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were common criminals, while the other half were convicted of “terrorism.”
Belgrade released this final group of prisoners into UNMIK’s custody in March 2002.
Many analysts view the progress made in Kosovo in the past three-and-a-half
years as mixed.  Kosovo has had the most free and fair elections in its history, and
has set up autonomous institutions.  Violence against political opponents and
minorities has declined, but continues to occur.  Little progress has been made in
returning Serb refugees to their homes, and crimes involving property and business
interests continue to be a problem. Kosovo is a center for prostitution, human
trafficking, drugs and weapons smuggling, money laundering, and other illegal
activities. Official corruption (reportedly including UNMIK representatives in some
cases) is a serious problem. International reconstruction aid has helped rebuild much
of the infrastructure destroyed in the war, but the economy is largely unreformed and
suffers from low foreign investment and high unemployment. 
The Issue of Kosovo’s Final Status
The formation of Kosovo’s elected government in March 2002 marked an
important step forward in the international community’s efforts to stabilize the
province.  However, the issue of Kosovo’s final status remains unclear.  U.N.
Resolution 1244 reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and did not prescribe or prejudge a permanent
political resolution to the issue of Kosovo’s status. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
strongly favor independence of the province from the FRY and its international
recognition as a sovereign state as soon as possible.  Kosovo’s independence is
strongly opposed by the United States and other Western countries, as well as by all
of Kosovo’s neighbors, except Albania.  They fear that an independent Kosovo could
destabilize the region by encouraging separatist ethnic Albanian forces in Macedonia,
as well as Serbia’s Presevo Valley, where many ethnic Albanians live.  
In 2002, UNMIK chief Michael Steiner outlined a series of benchmarks of
international expectations for Kosovo’s institutions and society, and argued that they
should be achieved before the issue of Kosovo’s final status is discussed.  The policy
has been dubbed “standards before status.” Kosovar Albanians have expressed
irritation with the benchmarks concept, in particular the idea that their fulfillment
should be a precondition to addressing the status question.  They believe this
approach is designed to block their aspirations for independence indefinitely.
Moreover, they claim that the Constitutional Framework does not give them enough
authority to achieve the benchmarks, especially in the area of law and order.
Some experts have expressed skepticism about the feasibility of the international
community’s efforts to postpone clarification of the final status issue to an indefinite
future. They believe that it is unrealistic to try to ignore  the clearly expressed desire
of the overwhelming majority of the population of Kosovo on the issue that they see,
rightly or wrongly, as most important to them.   Some also believe that the
uncertainty created by postponing the resolution of this issue could have a negative
impact on Kosovo’s political and economic stability. Indeed, some Kosovars claim
that continued uncertainty over Kosovo’s ultimate future has had a negative impact
CRS-8
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[http://www.crisisweb.org]
3 United States Institute of Peace, “Kosovo Decision Time,” February 2003.
on such issues as rule of law, privatization and attracting foreign investment.
Moreover, the international community is increasingly preoccupied with other global
challenges, and may seek to move forward on the issue of a final settlement in order
to begin to wind down the international peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.    
In October 2000, an independent commission of experts produced a report
advocating “conditional independence” for Kosovo.  Under the proposal, the
international community would gradually turn over full powers to the Kosovo
government and recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state, if it agreed to certain
conditions, which could include respecting the territorial integrity of neighboring
countries, real guarantees of democracy and minority rights, a renunciation of
violence to solve internal and external disputes, and regional cooperation.  In March
2002, the International Crisis Group produced a report advocating the opening of
talks on Kosovo’s final status without delay.  These talks would be in parallel with
institution-building efforts, but would not depend on them. The report considers  the
question of conditional independence. This independence would take place “under
a form of international trusteeship” until benchmarks similar to those outlined by
Steiner are met.2  A February 2003 report by the U.S. Institute for Peace does not call
for immediate talks on status, but says the United States and other major international
players should explicitly link the UNMIK benchmarks to a decision on final status
and that final status talks should start by 2005, “at the latest.”3
Serbian Views
The Serbian government, as well as Kosovo’s Serbs, are strongly opposed to
Kosovo’s independence.  Although the democratic leadership in Belgrade is not
pleased with the loss of effective Serbian control over the province enshrined in
UNSC Res. 1244, it views positively the resolution’s support for at least nominal
FRY sovereignty over the province.  Serbian officials have tended to sharply criticize
efforts by  UNMIK to implement those parts of UNSC Res. 1244 that call for the
handover of powers to autonomous Kosovo institutions, viewing them as stepping-
stones to Kosovo independence. Serbian Deputy Prime Minister and Kosovo envoy
Nebojsa Covic has met frequently with the UNMIK officials and has served as a key
voice for Kosovo’s Serb community, which has looked to Belgrade rather than
Pristina for leadership.  Covic has argued that while Belgrade has cooperated on
many fronts, no progress has been made with regard to refugee returns (including the
return of their property), illegally imprisoned Serbs in Kosovo, or the fate of over one
thousand missing or kidnaped individuals.  However, Serbian leaders have had to
balance their criticism of Western policy in Kosovo with their need to secure Western
aid to rebuilding their economy.  
  Earlier this year, viewing UNMIK’s plans to transfer powers to the Kosovo
government as a step toward Kosovo’s independence, Djindjic proposed early talks
on Kosovo’s status.  He said that if Kosovo were permitted to hold a referendum on
independence, Bosnian Serbs should be permitted to do the same.   Djindjic called
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for the return of Serbian troops to Kosovo, consistent with UNSC Resolution 1244.
In January 2003, Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo formed an “Association of
Serbian Municipalities,” to coordinate their activities with each other and the Serbian
government.  Such moves could be seen as an effort to prepare the way for a partition
of Kosovo.4  
Deputy Prime Minister Covic has floated a cantonization plan for the province.
Under the plan, Serbian-majority areas of the province would be controlled by local
Serb authorities, with their own police, and possibly with the deployment of Serbian
police and army troops.   Ethnic Albanian authorities would control the rest of the
province.  Such a plan would have the benefit, from Belgrade’s point of view, of
consolidating its control over northern Kosovo, where most Serbs in the province
now live, and where important economic assets, such as the Trepca mining complex,
are found.   Ethnic Albanian leaders have strongly opposed the idea for these very
reasons.  International officials fear that cantonization could lead to the eventual
partition of the province along ethnic lines, which could in turn spark renewed
violence.   The March 2003 murder of Prime Minister Djindjic has not led to major
changes in Serbia’s Kosovo policy.
The issue of Kosovo’s status may be complicated by the dissolution of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and  the establishment of a much looser relationship
between Serbia and Montenegro. A new Constitutional Charter to govern their
relations came into effect in February 2003.  The charter describes Kosovo as part of
Serbia, a provision that has been denounced by Kosovar Albanians.  Kosovar
Albanians claim that because the FRY no longer exists, Kosovo can no longer be
considered part of it, and should be free to choose (via a referendum) independence.
On the other hand, the Kosovo Serbs claim that the deal between Serbia and
Montenegro, which was heavily promoted by representatives of the international
community, was intended to forestall the further disintegration of states and regions
in the former Yugoslavia, and demonstrated international opposition to Kosovo’s
independence.  
International Administration
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999) forms the basis of the
international role in Kosovo.  It authorized the deployment of an international
security presence in Kosovo, led by NATO, under a mission to ensure the withdrawal
of Yugoslav armed forces from Kosovo, the demilitarization of the KLA, and the
maintenance of the cease-fire.   U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 gives the
U.N. mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) the chief role in administering Kosovo on a
provisional basis. UNMIK’s duties include performing basic civil administration of
the province; maintaining law and order, including setting up an international police
force and creating local police forces; supporting humanitarian aid efforts; facilitating
the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes; protecting human rights;
supporting the reconstruction effort; preparing the way for elections and the creation
of self-government institutions; and facilitating a political process to address
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Kosovo’s final status.  Resolution 1244 provides for an interim period of autonomy
for Kosovo until negotiations on the final status of the province take place. It
expresses support for the FRY’s territorial integrity.
Bernard Kouchner of France served as the first Special Representative of the
U.N. Secretary-General (SRSG) to oversee UNMIK until January 2001.  He was
replaced by Hans Haekkerup, Denmark’s Defense Minister, whose brief term in
Kosovo ended in December 2001.  Michael Steiner, a German diplomat with
extensive experience in the former Yugoslavia, became the third SRSG in early 2002.
Steiner ended his term in July 2003.  His replacement has yet to be named, but will
likely be nominated by the European Union.  In the interim, Principal Deputy Charles
Brayshaw of the United States heads the U.N. mission.
UNMIK initially had a four-pillar structure divided into humanitarian aid, civil
administration, democratic institution-building, and reconstruction.  UNMIK phased
out the humanitarian aid pillar in mid-2000 and added a police and justice pillar in
2001.  The United Nations leads the police and justice pillar as well as the one for
civil administration; the Organization for Security and Cooperation leads the
institution-building pillar; and the European Union leads the reconstruction pillar.
The authorization for UNMIK automatically continues unless the Security
Council decides otherwise.  Since the creation of autonomous governing institutions
after the November 2001 elections, UNMIK has been engaged with the process of
transferring some governing responsibilities to Kosovo’s provisional institutions. In
April 2002, UNMIK chief Steiner offered a “vision on how to finish our job,” or an
“exit strategy” for the international mission.  He outlined a “standards before status”
approach that included a series of benchmarks for Kosovo’s institutions and society
that should be achieved before addressing Kosovo’s final status. 
The benchmarks are:
- the existence of effective, representative and functioning institutions;
- enforcement of the rule of law;
- freedom of movement;
- respect for the right of all Kosovans to remain and return;
- development of a sound basis for a market economy;
- clarity of property title;
- normalized dialogue with Belgrade;
- reduction and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps in line with its
mandate.5
UNMIK’s activities continue to be guided by the “standards before status” approach.
However, even as UNMIK downsizes and transfers a greater number of
administrative competencies to Kosovo’s self-governing institutions, it is clear to
most observers that UNMIK’s ability to “finish the job” may ultimately depend on
a resolution to the question of Kosovo’s final status.
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KFOR6
KFOR’s mission, in accordance with UNSC 1244, is to monitor, verify, and
enforce the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement and the KLA
demilitarization agreement.  KFOR is also charged with establishing and maintaining
a secure environment in Kosovo to facilitate the return of refugees, the delivery of
humanitarian aid, and the operation of the international civilian administration.
KFOR has actively supported UNMIK’s activities, including recent efforts to meet
benchmarks of progress and to transfer increased responsibilities, especially related
to law enforcement, to Kosovo’s interim civil authorities.  Resolution 1244 includes
a provision that says KFOR is to oversee the return of “hundreds, not thousands” of
Yugoslav troops to Kosovo to liaise with the international presence, mark minefields,
provide a “presence” at Serb historical monuments and “key border crossings.”  To
date, no troops from Serbia and Montenegro have returned to Kosovo for these
purposes, although in March 2001, NATO approved the phased return of Serbia and
Montenegro forces to the formerly demilitarized buffer zone between Kosovo and the
rest of Serbia.  
 As of mid-2003, KFOR comprised about 24,000 troops from 36 nations,
including about 2,200 troops from the United States.  The United States controls one
of four KFOR sectors in Kosovo, Multinational Brigade East, or MNB (E).  The
other sectors are Multinational Brigade Northeast (MNB-NE), Multinational Brigade
Center (MNB-C), Multinational Brigade Southwest (MNB-SW), in addition to
KFOR Headquarters.  
NATO reviews KFOR’s mission every six months and periodically considers
plans to adjust force structure, reduce force levels, and eventually to withdraw from
Kosovo.  KFOR’s force strength has been reduced by over half from its peak in 1999
of nearly 50,000.  On the basis of its mid-2003 mission review and reflecting
KFOR’s assessment that the overall security situation remains stable, NATO agreed
to continue to “regionalize and rationalize” KFOR’s force structure and size.  KFOR
is to further streamline its operations and reduce its strength to 17,500 by the end of
2003.  The U.S. share of KFOR will remain at or below 15% of the total force during
this stage.  In upcoming mission reviews, NATO is expected to consider further
reductions in KFOR and adjustments to its mission and command structure, as
increased responsibilities for security matters are transferred to civil authorities.  As
with UNMIK, however, analysts doubt whether international forces can fully
disengage from Kosovo so long as the status of the province remains unsettled.
Ethnic minorities have expressed concerns about their security, especially as KFOR
has reduced its forces. Violence against ethnic minorities had declined substantially
since 1999, but serious incidents continue to occur.
In addition to providing for a secure environment in Kosovo, KFOR has been
sporadically engaged with security problems in southern Serbia and neighboring
Macedonia.  In 2000 and 2001, U.S., Russian and other KFOR peacekeepers detained
scores of men and seized substantial quantities of weaponry in an attempt to stop
CRS-12
ethnic Albanian guerrillas from moving men and supplies into the 3 mile-wide
demilitarized Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) in southern Serbia, which served as a
staging area for guerrilla attacks against Serbian police in the Presevo valley region.
In March 2001, NATO agreed to the gradual elimination of the GSZ and oversaw a
phased return of most of the GSZ to the Yugoslav army and Serbian police forces.
The ethnic Albanian guerrilla groups officially disbanded, although some extremists
still remain active, mainly with the self-styled Albanian National Army.  
The guerrilla insurgency in Macedonia in 2001 also presented challenges to
KFOR.  Macedonian officials charged that KFOR had failed to stop the transport of
weapons and men from Kosovo to the guerrillas over the heavily forested and
mountainous border region between Kosovo and Macedonia.  KFOR troops had
limited success in blocking rebel supply routes in the remote and rugged border
region.  After the parties in Macedonia reached a peace agreement in August 2001,
NATO countries sent a small force, separate from KFOR, to monitor the
disarmament of the rebels and security situation in the country.  NATO transferred
command of the force in Macedonia to the European Union in March 2003. 
Institution-building
Under the 2001 Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government,
Kosovo is governed by a combination of international administration and provisional
institutions of self-government.  On the basis of the November 2001 Kosovo-wide
elections, a Kosovo assembly, President, and government were established. UNMIK
retains ultimate executive authority over the Kosovo provisional institutions,
including veto power, and exclusive authority in some areas, so-called Article VIII
reserved powers.  These reserved responsibilities include justice, minority rights
protection, customs, monetary policy, the budget, and authority over the Kosovo
Protection Corps, among others.  Non-reserved responsibilities, which are listed in
Article V of the framework, are in the process of being transferred from UNMIK to
the Kosovo provisional government.  A transfer council comprising representatives
from UNMIK and the Kosovo provisional institutions oversees the competency
transfer process.  In May 2003, the council agreed on the phased transfer of 19 out
of 44 non-reserved competencies; the remainder are supposed to be transferred by the
end of 2003.  UNMIK officials have lauded the development of Kosovo’s provisional
institutions, but emphasize that further progress needs to be made before Kosovo can
meet the standard of having functioning democratic and representative institutions.
In particular, UN representatives have criticized deficient or inappropriate actions
taken by the Kosovo Assembly.
A prominent responsibility reserved by UNMIK is the Kosovo Protection Corps
(KPC), a civilian emergency response force.  UNMIK developed the KPC as a means
to “civilianize” former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army. However, KPC
 leaders frequently refer to their organization as the basis for a future Kosovo military
force.  The authorized strength of the KPC is 3,052 active members and 2,000
reserved.  Its current strength is 2,954 active and 1,740 reserved members (as of June
2003).  Minority representation in the KPC remains minimal.  Relations between the
KPC and UNMIK suffered a setback in early 2003 after some KPC members were
implicated in a bombing incident carried out by an extremist Albanian group.
UNMIK continues to investigate KPC ties to ethnic Albanian militant extremists.
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(continued...)
Rule of Law
Rates of serious or deadly criminal incidents in Kosovo have steadily dropped
year-by-year, according to international reporting, although some serious incidents
continue to take place.  International representatives have noted that inter-ethnic
crime has gone down while intra-ethnic crime has increased. A recent exception to
this trend was the June 2003 murder of three Kosovo Serbs in the town of Obilic,
which was condemned as a hate crime by U.N. and Kosovo governmental officials.
UNMIK and KFOR have pledged to take additional measures to improve security for
minority communities.  Beyond violent crime, organized criminal activity, including
smuggling and trafficking in persons, has increased.  International judicial panels
have begun to consider serious criminal cases relating to war crimes and terrorist
acts.  In July 2003, a Kosovo district court found four former KLA members guilty
of war crimes and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from five to fifteen years.
The ruling was the first conviction of Kosovo Albanians for war crimes since the end
of 1999 war.  Local judicial bodies deal with all civil and most criminal cases.  Over
350 local judges and nearly 46 prosecutors, including some minority representatives,
are currently in place.  Parallel judicial structures supported by Belgrade continue to
exist in Serbian-majority municipalities.
Policing in Kosovo is a shared responsibility between international and local
Kosovo police forces.  The UNMIK police force comprises about 4,000 officers from
nearly 50 countries.  The UN police presence has begun to decrease as local police
forces have grown and developed.  However, UNMIK retains overall authority over
Kosovo’s law enforcement institutions.  Under its institution-building pillar headed
by the OSCE, UNMIK opened a training academy for the KPA in August 1999.  By
mid-June 2003, over 5,500 officers had completed basic police training.  Serb
participation in KPS has reached about 10%.  KPS plans to reach a maximum
capacity of 6,500 police officers by mid-2004.  UNMIK police have gradually shifted
greater responsibilities to the KPS as its ranks and capabilities have grown.  Despite
these improvements in policing, freedom of movement remains difficult in some
parts of the province, especially for the Kosovo Serb minority. 
Economy
Kosovo’s economic situation has improved since the end of the 1999 war,
largely as a result of substantial international reconstruction aid inflows, but remains
underdeveloped.  In particular, unemployment, estimated at nearly 60% of the
population, is a primary concern.  Other prominent problems affecting the economy
have included the operation of public utilities, especially electricity, smuggling, and
other organized criminal activity.  Foreign donor support and remittances from
Albanians abroad have helped to fuel 11% GDP growth in 2001 and 7% growth in
2002.  Foreign assistance for budgetary support, reconstruction assistance, and peace





8 Persons (both ethnic Albanian and Serb) who have fled their homes in Kosovo are
considered refugees if located outside of Serbia and Montenegro, and internally displaced
if they remain in Kosovo or elsewhere in Serbia or Montenegro.
International efforts are currently focused on privatization and fostering private
sector growth, as well as creating a legal framework for a self-sustaining economy
and strengthening the financial sector. Among other things, these efforts have led to
improvements in budget revenue collection through internal taxation and customs
income.  In April 2002, UNMIK chief Steiner announced the creation of a Kosovo
Trust Agency to manage and oversee the process of privatization, which is intended
to spur job creation and attract investment. In May 2003, the Kosovo Trust Agency
announced its first six tenders for the privatization of socially-owned enterprises.
Returns
The vast majority of ethnic Albanian refugees and displaced persons from the
conflict returned to Kosovo with remarkable speed after June 1999.  However, as
ethnic Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo, large numbers of ethnic Serbs and
Roma (Gypsies) left the province, mainly for Serbia and Montenegro. UNHCR
estimated that over 200,000 Serbs and Roma left Kosovo after the end of the NATO
air strikes in June 1999.8  Since 2000, only a small number of displaced minorities,
around an estimated 7,000, have returned to Kosovo, and mostly to ethnic enclaves.
The security situation for those who do return remains precarious.  UNMIK has
worked in recent years to establish a comprehensive framework to support returns,
and the number of returns has increased in the past two years, but still remains small.
Moreover, the proportion of Kosovo Serbs who return remains at a lower level than
that of other minority groups.  The international community continues to support the
principle that all refugees and displaced persons have the right to their homes.  Donor
nations have focused on minority refugee and displaced returns as a priority area for
2003 and beyond.
At his final briefing before the United Nations in early July 2003, outgoing
SRSG Steiner said that the slow progress achieved to date in refugee returns and the
integration of minority communities represented the international community’s most
serious shortcoming in Kosovo.  However, he welcomed the open appeal made in
July by Kosovo Albanian leaders urging non-Albanian displaced persons and
refugees in Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia to return to Kosovo. Kosovo’s
interim governmental leaders have also called on the majority ethnic Albanian
community  to support the return process. 
War Crimes
On May 27, 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY)  announced the indictment of Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic, Serbian President Milan Milutinovic, FRY Deputy Prime Minister Nikola
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Sainovic, Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Serbian Minister of
Internal Affairs Vlajko Stojiljkovic for war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed by Yugoslav and Serbian forces in Kosovo. The indictments were the first
issued by the Tribunal relating to the Kosovo conflict. (These indictments were
amended in June and October 2001 to add new charges related to the Kosovo
conflict.)   The ICTY is focusing its efforts on high-level officials.  Local courts in
Kosovo headed by international judges and prosecutors are trying cases against low-
level accused war criminals.  
On June 13, 2000, Del Ponte released a report that said that she would not indict
NATO officials for alleged war crimes during NATO’s air campaign.  The report said
that “although some mistakes were made by NATO, the Prosecutor is satisfied that
there was no deliberate targeting of civilians or unlawful military targets by NATO
during the campaign.”   In June and November 2002, UNMIK police arrested former
KLA soldiers, including a former top commander known as Remi, for murders of
ethnic Albanians during the war in Kosovo.  The charges were brought by an
international prosecutor in Kosovo’s justice system, not by the ICTY.  In February
2003, KFOR arrested and transferred to the Tribunal three former KLA fighters
indicted by the ICTY for war crimes against Serbs and Albanians.  A fourth indictee
was later transferred to the ICTY by Slovenia. 
 Anxious to avoid a U.S. boycott of a June 29, 2001 conference of aid donors
to the FRY, the Serbian government transferred Milosevic to the ICTY on June 28.
Milosevic’s trial for crimes committed in Kosovo began in February 2002.   After the
FRY passed a law on cooperation with the Tribunal in April 2002,  Ojdanic and
Sainovic surrendered to the Tribunal. Stojiljkovic committed suicide outside the
Yugoslav parliament building.  The March 2003 murder of Serbian Prime Minister
Zoran Djindjic, and the possibility of a U.S. aid cutoff for non-cooperation with the
ICTY, led Serbia in June 2003 to hand over  additional indictees wanted by the ICTY
for crimes in Kosovo and elsewhere.  These included former intelligence chief Jovica
Stanisic and paramilitary leader Franko Simatovic (known as “Frenki”). However,
even after the surrender of these indictees, Del Ponte continued to warn that some
indictees still remain on Serbia’s soil and that Serbia has not completely cooperated
with the Tribunal on other issues, including the provision of documents from
Yugoslav archives.  Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic has said his government
was committed to transferring all indicted persons on Serbian  territory to The Hague.
He said that this could happen by the end of 2003.9     
U.S. Policy
From the beginning of the conflict in Kosovo, the Clinton Administration
condemned Serbian human rights abuses and called for autonomy for Kosovo within
Yugoslavia, while opposing independence.  The Clinton Administration pushed for
air strikes against Yugoslavia when Belgrade rejected the Rambouillet accords in
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March 1999, but refused to consider the use of ground troops to eject Yugoslav
forces from Kosovo.  However, even before the air strikes, the Clinton
Administration said that U.S. troops would participate in a Kosovo peacekeeping
force if a peace agreement were reached.  After the conflict, President Clinton said
that the U.S. and  NATO troop commitment to Kosovo could be reduced as local
autonomous institutions took  hold.   He said that the United States and the European
Union must work together to rebuild Kosovo and the region, but that “Europe must
provide most of the resources.”10 
During the 2000 Presidential campaign, Condoleezza Rice, later appointed by
President-elect Bush as his National Security Advisor, said that U.S. military forces
are overextended globally, and that peacekeeping responsibilities in the Balkans
should be taken over by U.S. allies in Europe.  However, after taking office, the
Administration  appeared to adopt a more cautious tone.  In February 2001, Secretary
of State Colin Powell said that the United States had a commitment to peace in the
Balkans  and that NATO forces would have to remain in Bosnia and Kosovo for
“years.” He said the United States was reviewing U.S. troop levels in Bosnia and
Kosovo with the objective of reducing them over time, but stressed that the United
States would act in consultation with its allies and was not “cutting and running.” 
During a July 24, 2001 visit to U.S. troops in Kosovo, President Bush reiterated
this position, saying that 
we will not draw down our forces in Bosnia or Kosovo precipitously or
unilaterally.  We came in together, and we will go out together.  But our goal is
to hasten the day when peace is self-sustaining, when local, democratically
elected authorities can assume full responsibility, and when NATO's forces can
go home.  This means that we must re-organize and re-energize our efforts to
build civil institutions and promote rule of law.  It also means that we must step
up our efforts to transfer responsibilities for public security from combat forces
to specialized units, international police, and ultimately local authorities.
NATO's commitment to the peace of this region is enduring, but the stationing
of our forces here should not be indefinite.  
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States (including the
deployment of U.S. troops to Afghanistan) and the conflict in Iraq reinforced the
Administration’s desire to decrease the U.S. deployment in the Balkans.  The number
of troops in KFOR has declined from about 38,000 in June 2002 to roughly 24,000
today, with the U.S. contingent falling from 5,500 to 2,250.   KFOR is expected to
undergo further reductions to as low as 17,500 troops by the end of 2003.11
During a visit to U.S. troops in the Balkans in May 2003, Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz said that peacekeeping in the Balkans “continues to be a
very important mission to the U.S. and NATO...”  He added that “the last thing
anyone wants to see in the light of September 11 is to have a failed state here in the
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heart of Europe.”12  Wolfowitz said the United States has an interest in making sure
that the region does not become a haven for terrorists.   He added that the United
States and its allies would, as in the past, look for opportunities to reduce the size of
SFOR and KFOR, as well as the U.S. troop presence in the region, as long as such
reductions do not compromise the mission.13
Despite its desire to reduce U.S. peacekeeping forces in the Balkans, in the wake
of the Iraq conflict the Administration has appeared reluctant to turn over complete
control of peacekeeping efforts to the Europeans. At a NATO Foreign Ministers
meeting in Madrid on June 3-4, 2003, U.S. officials rejected an EU proposal to take
over the NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Bosnia in mid-2004 as “premature.”
Some Europeans  expressed surprise at U.S. opposition to the move, given long-
standing U.S. support for a greater European role in Balkan peacekeeping.  They
have attributed this alleged shift in U.S. policy to perceived U.S. mistrust of the
desire of several EU member states to establish an EU defense capability independent
of NATO.  In their view, by blocking an EU takeover of SFOR, the Administration
can retard development of a cohesive EU defense identity and capability.14 It is also
possible that the Administration’s willingness to accept an extended, if modest, U.S.
deployment in Bosnia and Kosovo is also indirectly related to reported U.S. plans to
set up bases in neighboring Romania and Bulgaria for training purposes and as
possible jumping-off points for operations in the Caucasus and Middle East.15  The
region’s higher strategic profile may underline the importance of maintaining
stability in the Balkans as a whole. 
In 2001, the United States condemned the ethnic Albanian guerrillas in
Macedonia as a threat to peace and stability in the region, including former KLA
fighters in Kosovo, some of whom held key roles in the rebellion.   On June 27,
2001, President Bush issued an Executive Order prohibiting Americans from
"transferring, paying, exporting, withdrawing or otherwise dealing in the property or
interests in property of persons involved in violent and obstructionist actions" in the
Balkans.  Bush also barred entry to the United States of those "who actively obstruct
implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords or UN Security Council Resolution
1244 and who otherwise seek to undermine peace and stability in the region" or "who
are responsible for wartime atrocities committed in the region since 1991."  The order
lists 35 persons and organizations covered by the restrictions, including the leaders
of ethnic Albanian guerrilla groups in Macedonia and southern Serbia, as well as
persons and groups in Kosovo supporting them.16  The United States helped broker
the August 2001 Ohrid peace accords that put an end to the conflict in Macedonia.
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 The Bush Administration opposes an “immediate”decision on Kosovo’s status,
including independence for Kosovo or any effort to partition the province into
Serbian and ethnic Albanian regions.  It has supported the “standards before status”
policy  favored by UNMIK and the EU.   This approach calls for the autonomous
Kosovo government to achieve a number of benchmarks (including progress toward
creating a functioning democratic government, free market economy, the rule of law
and respect for ethnic minorities) before the issue of Kosovo’s status is discussed.
Early discussions of status, the Administration believes, would bring to a halt
progress on the benchmarks, which must be accomplished to achieve lasting stability
in the region.  Administration officials say that an early decision on the status
question could destabilize Kosovo and the region, perhaps leading to renewed
fighting in Kosovo, southern Serbia and Macedonia.17 
According to the Department of Defense Comptroller’s Office, DoD
incremental costs for Kosovo through FY 2003 (est.) were $8.2 billion.  This figure
included $1.89 billion for the 1999 NATO air war, $5.23 billion for KFOR, $141.6
million in refugee aid, $34.6 million for the OSCE observer mission before the war,
and $20.3 million for the pre-war aerial verification mission.18   From FY1999
through FY2001, the United States obligated $425.8 million in bilateral aid to
Kosovo.19  In FY2002, the United States provided $118 million in FY2002, and
planned to provide $85 million in aid to Kosovo in FY2003.  In FY2004, the
Administration requested $79 million for Kosovo.20  Since 1999, U.S. aid has shifted
away from humanitarian and reconstruction aid toward assistance aimed at
democratization, the rule of law and establishing a free market economy.
Congressional Response
In 1999, the 106th Congress debated whether U.S. and NATO air strikes in
Kosovo were in the U.S. national interest, and whether the President could undertake
them without congressional approval. In the end, Congress neither explicitly
approved nor blocked the air strikes, but appropriated funds for the air campaign and
the U.S. peacekeeping deployment in Kosovo after the fact.  In 2000, some Members
unsuccessfully attempted to condition the U.S. military deployment in Kosovo on
Congressional approval and on the implementation of aid pledges made by European
countries.  Many Members of Congress said that they expected U.S. allies in Europe
to contribute the lion’s share of aid to the region and expressed concern that
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European countries were slow to implement their aid pledges.  Congress moved to
limit U.S. aid to Kosovo to 15% of the total amount pledged by all countries.21
The 107th Congress focused on limiting the cost of the continuing U.S.
engagement in Kosovo.  The FY2002 foreign aid appropriations law (P.L. 107-115)
provides $621 million in aid for central and eastern Europe under the Support for
East European Democracy (SEED) program, but no earmark for Kosovo.  The bill
says that aid to Kosovo “should  not exceed 15 percent of the total resources pledged
by all donors for calendar year 2002 for assistance for Kosovo as of March 31, 2002.”
The bill also bars U.S. aid for “large scale physical infrastructure reconstruction” in
Kosovo.  The FY2002 defense authorization law (P.L. 107-107) limited funding for
U.S. peacekeeping troops to $1.5286 billion.  The President may waive this provision
if he certifies that the waiver is in the national security interest of the United States
and that it will not adversely affect the readiness of U.S. forces.  The President must
submit a report on these issues as well as a supplemental appropriations request.
In FY2003 foreign operations legislation (P.L. 108-007), Congress provided
$525 million in SEED aid, with no earmark for Kosovo.  Congress also included the
15% aid ceiling and restriction on large-scale infrastructure projects as  it had in
previous years.  The bill says $1 million “should” be provided for training programs
for Kosovar women.  
In the 108th Congress, several resolutions have been introduced that advocate
U.S. support for Kosovo’s independence.  H.Res. 11 and H.Res. 28 express the sense
of the House that the United States should declare support for Kosovo’s
independence.  H.Res. 11 conditions this support on Kosovo’s progress toward
democracy, while H.Res. 28 supports independence without prior conditions.  S.Res.
144 expresses the sense of the Senate that the United States should support the right
of the people of Kosovo to determine their political future once “requisite progress”
is made in achieving U.N. benchmarks in developing democratic institutions and
human rights protections.  On May 21, 2003, the House International Relations
Committee held a hearing that dealt with H.Res. 28 and the future of Kosovo.
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